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      Abstract 
 
A current body of research examines Colombia’s judicial institutions and focuses on the 
successes and failures of past reforms. While the literature is overwhelmingly negative, scholars 
have managed to put forward pieces of a potential solution. I draw on these analyses to answer 
the question, “what is the best possible course of action for Colombia’s future judicial reform 
projects?” Throughout this paper, I draw on Colombian newspapers, think-tank reports, survey 
research, and academic studies to formulate a cohesive answer. This existing literature identifies 
that Colombia’s weak judiciary stems from Spanish colonialism’s lasting influence, the reactive 
and defensive nature of judges, and persistent political instability. While past reforms have 
addressed general problems within the nation, I find that Colombia could benefit from a 
targeted, phased reform agenda. I conclude Colombia’s judiciary needs a serious round of 
comprehensive reforms to address its lack of competence, accountability, and transparency. 
Moreover, future reforms could benefit from a reformed budget and increased civil society 
participation. These adjustments could then facilitate public trust in the government, thus 
propelling its legitimacy.     
 
Lay Summary  
 
Since the 1980s, numerous Latin American countries have initiated difficult and lengthy 
processes of democratic transition. While some have introduced sweeping reforms to address 
serious problems within their justice systems, governments still struggle to administer justice 
efficiently. Despite the newly drafted constitutions aiming to guarantee the protection of citizens' 
rights, there is a significant gap between constitutional promises and the actual behavior of 
judicial officials. Citizens suffer from this failure of justice the most, as they routinely encounter 
widespread corruption, inefficiency, and apathy from their government officials. Nowhere is the 
corruption, inefficiency, and apathy greater than in Colombia. My thesis will explore the past 
and present judicial reform attempts in Colombia. I will closely analyze how historical and 
institutional factors have played a central role in the country’s attempt at reform. I will also 
examine the introduction of the Constitutional Court, its strengths and weaknesses, the general 
failure of reforms, and the ongoing debates in Colombia regarding the proper path toward 
reform. Finally, I propose a series of reforms that the Colombian government could take to 














 Since it gained its independence from Spain more than two centuries ago, Colombia has 
attempted to create a genuinely democratic government. In the mid-nineteenth century, two 
powerful political parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, gained control over Colombia’s 
political institutions1 and controlled politics in the country for the next 150 years. In the 1940s, 
an intense feud developed between these two parties that triggered La Violencia, a civil war that 
lasted for almost two decades and took the lives of more than 200,000 people. After a short 
period of relative peace in the early 1970s, groups not allied with either of the two dominant 
parties found themselves excluded and marginalized, as widespread protests led to another round 
of violent uprisings.   
 Adding to this chaos, two violent groups challenged the government further. First, 
paramilitary groups, allied with political elites, launched violent assaults against the left-wing 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which had been mounting violent upheaval 
since the 1960s. At the same time, the Colombian state confronted a vicious war with organized 
crime, in particular, with the large drug-trafficking cartels. The U.S. consumer demand for 
cocaine had skyrocketed, and the Colombian cartels moved quickly. They paid local farmers to 
grow coca in the Andean mountains, process the coca into cocaine paste, and trans-ship it into 
the U.S. to sell at high prices. The turf wars and competition associated with the trafficking 
networks led to record-breaking crime rates and widespread violence across the country. Both 
the cartels and the insurgents carried out regular attacks on infrastructure, civil society, 
 
1 Bruce M. Wilson, “Institutional Reform and Rights Revolutions in Latin America: The Cases of Costa Rica and 
Colombia,” Journal of Politics in Latin America 1, no. 2 (2009): 68-70, 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1866802X0900100203.  
 
politicians, political institutions, journalists, and business elites. This led to the death of 
thousands of social activists, journalists, politicians, judicial officials, and law enforcement 
officers.2 Through the 1980s, tens of thousands of Colombian citizens lost their lives, and people 
in marginalized communities lost any chance at claiming their civil and political rights. Medellin 
became the murder capital of the world. In 1990, 6349 people were murdered in the city. This is 
equivalent to 380 deaths per 100,000 people.3  Scholars and journalists routinely referred to the 
country as a “failed state.”4  
 Starting in the early 1990s, a combination of regional cooperation, enhanced law-
enforcement techniques, and markedly increased domestic and international funding diminished 
the power of first, the Medellín Cartel, and then of the Cali Cartel. In 1993, the Colombian 
military, alongside the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) killed the leader of the 
Medellín Cartel, Pablo Escobar. By 2006, the brothers who headed the Cali Cartel, Miguel 
Rodríguez Orejuela and Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela, were arrested, convicted, and given 30-
year sentences. These two major events shifted the leading international criminal networks’ 
center of operations from Colombia to Mexico. This also initiated a new era in Colombian 
history with markedly less drug-related violence. 
 Nevertheless, FARC continued to wreak havoc in the country. By 1999, its membership 
had burgeoned to more than 18,000 members, and its violent attacks continued. The organization 
carried out more than 3000 kidnappings that year. In response, nearly a quarter of the Colombian 
 
2 Norman A. Bailey, "La Violencia in Colombia," Journal of Inter-American Studies 9, no. 4 (1967): 561-75, 
doi:10.2307/164860.  
3 Sibylla Brodzinsky, “From Murder Capital to Model City: is Medellín's Miracle Show or Substance?” The 
Guardian, April 17, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/apr/17/medellin-murder-capital-to-model-city-
miracle-un-world-urban-forum. For reference, the murder rate in the U.S. in 2019 was roughly 4.5 deaths per 
100,000. The murder rate in Baltimore, the country’s most violent city, averages around 50 deaths per 100,000. 
4 Michael Shifter and Vinay Jawahar, "State Building in Colombia: Getting Priorities Straight.” Journal of 
International Affairs 58, no. 1 (2004): 143-154, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357939. 
 
population launched a massive strike across the country, calling for an end to the violence.5 The 
“No Más” (“no more”) protests helped bring the FARC to the negotiation table with the 
Colombian government. Although, it took another 17 years before FARC and the Colombian 
government signed a peace accord. By the late 1990s, the violence finally started to subside. 
Beginning in the late 1990s, the Colombian government, like many other governments across the 
region, took significant steps to create a more open, accountable democratic state with a fair 
system of justice. Its first order of business was to write a new constitution.   
 This thesis examines Colombia’s judicial reforms that resulted in the creation of a 
Constitutional Court, formed primarily to focus on the rights and grievances of marginalized 
citizens. It first explores the process of designing a new constitution that showcased this new 
court and the obstacles that the architects of this document confronted. Second, it analyzes the 
performance of the Colombian courts, assessing both successes and failures. Third, it identifies 
lessons learned based on scholarly analyses of the effectiveness of these Colombian reforms. 
Finally, it proposes further reforms that Colombia might find valuable. I conclude Colombia 
could benefit if it were to implement specific phases of judicial reform, rather than broad 
programs that simultaneously target multiple areas of concern.  
 
II.     History of Colombia’s Attempts to Establish Constitutional Government 
 
 
5 David Rampf and Diana Chavarro, “The 1991 Colombian National Constituent Assembly: Turning Exclusion into 
Inclusion, or a Vain Endeavour?,” Inclusive Political Settlements Paper 1, (2014): 5, 
https://www.academia.edu/12650689/The_1991_Colombian_National_Constituent_Assembly_Turning_Exclusion_i
nto_Inclusion_or_a_Vain_Endeavour.  
 Colombia is no stranger to political instability, as it has implemented 13 constitutions 
since it declared its independence from Spain in 1810.6  Creating a workable model has never 
been easy, as the country’s struggle to form an effective and just judicial process continues 
today. The country’s founding fathers, who called their country Nueva Granada, adopted the 
liberal and democratic model based on that of France and the United States. The leaders of this 
new country argued over whether to create a centralized unitary government like that of France, 
or a federal union of territories like that of the U.S. Different perspectives eventually resulted in 
a compromise that adopted concepts from both models. The founders of Colombia modeled their 
bill of rights after that of France. The written constitution, which created a presidential system 
and an independent judicial structure, resembled that of the U.S. Scholars have argued, however, 
that a set of unwritten assumptions embedded in the U.S. Constitution were lost in translation, 
resulting in a less-flexible and overly strict implementation of the law in new Colombia.7 
 Like all Latin American countries, Colombia’s efforts to create a democratic government 
were hampered by its strong Spanish influences. Scholars generally agree that the economic, 
political, and cultural institutions and traditions inherited from Spain’s colonial domination 
remained deeply embedded.8 Political scientists argue good government creates “functioning 
 
6 New constitutions have appeared across Latin America for nearly two centuries. Indeed, the Latin American 
countries together have produced more constitutions than any other region in the world. Four Latin American 
countries have had more constitutions than any other country in the world. The Dominican Republic tops the list 
with 32, followed by Venezuela with 26, Haiti with 24, and Ecuador with 20. Moreover, the average lifespan of a 
constitution in Western Europe is 77 years; in Latin America, it is 16.5. Ryan Eustace, “Fluid Constitutions: A Latin 
American Phenomenon,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, July 3, 2014, https://www.coha.org/fluid-constitutions-a-
latin-american-phenomenon/.  
7 Luz Estella Nagle, “Evolution of the Colombian Judiciary and the Constitutional Court,” Indiana International and 
Comparative Law Review 6, no. 1 (1995): 60-62. https://doi.org/10.18060/17590.  
8 See, for example, Luz Estella Nagle, “The Cinderella of Government: Judicial Reform in Latin America,” 
California Western International Law Journal 30, no. 2, (2000): 348, 
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol30/iss2/8.  Also see Felipe Sáez García, “The Nature of Judicial 
Reform in Latin America and Some Strategic Considerations,” American University International Law Review 13, 
no. 5 (1998): 1267-3125, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/235402102. See also Pedro Bossio, "Exploring the Roots 
of Chronic Underdevelopment: The Colonial Encomienda and Resguardo and their Legacy to Modern Colombia," 
CUNY Academic Works (2018): 16-56, https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2475. 
legal and judicial institutions to accomplish the interrelated goals of promoting private sector 
development, encouraging the development of all other societal institutions, alleviating poverty, 
and consolidating democracy.” 9 As Luz Estella Nagle has argued, scholars emphasize judicial 
institutions because they provide the structures and procedures that ensure the proper functioning 
of institutions, and play a critical role in transforming ideas for reform into reality.10 However, 
the Colombian judicial branch has clearly failed to ensure justice to offer redress for legitimate 
grievances, to remain accessible and responsive, and to protect the rights of Colombian citizens. 
The legacy of Colombia's colonial past is partly to blame for several reasons. First, Spain granted 
minimal self-rule to its colonies. When the crown made decisions, the provisional governors, or 
members of the crown's "Council," enforced them. Members of the Council held absolute 
executive and judicial authority over all matters. Executive and judicial power remained fully 
intertwined. Many judicial decisions were thus products of political considerations. As a result, 
citizens thoroughly distrusted judicial outcomes. Once the region’s countries gained 
independence, power was transferred into the hands of local caudillos (strongmen) or small 
groups of military leaders (juntas). The courts then became instruments of the rulers used to 
enforce the ruling elite’s authority.11 Even as some Latin American countries adopted a more 
American-style separation-of-powers doctrine, judges remained powerless and controlled by the 
political elites.  
 Today, the judiciary continues to suffer from a systemic lack of respect across the region. 
Colombia, like many countries in the region, remained susceptible to the will of the legislative 
and executive branches for many years. As the judiciary feared reprisal from the other branches 
 
9  Nagle, “The Cinderella of Government,” 348. 
10 Ibid, 357.  
11 Ibid, 350-354.  
and the authority of the Catholic Church during Spanish colonialism, it generally remains subject 
to the will of those in power in two important ways. First, it has been subject to legislative and 
executive political ambition and corruption. Judicial officials have often been the target of 
violent acts of intimidation, as the Colombian government has generally failed to ensure the 
safety and security of its judicial officers. Second, other branches have regularly made the 
judiciary the scapegoat for the wrongs committed in the country. The judicial branch has 
consequently been forced to assume a purely defensive role regarding other major political 
actors. The judiciary has "long been little more than a maidservant, a Cinderella, to the other 
branches of government."12  Consequently, throughout Latin America, the judicial systems have 
been politically manipulated, corrupted, underfunded, understaffed, under-trained, and incapable 
of ensuring justice and protecting the rights of citizens. 
 In the 1980s, numerous Latin American governments moved to initiate democratic 
transitions. As the countries fell deeply into debt, and their militaries began to exit from power, 
the transitions were officially initiated. Further, a combination of internal and external pressures, 
especially from international financial lending institutions, brought about a reorganizing of 
government institutions and priorities. In many cases, the first order of business was to 
restructure the judicial system to make it more engaged and protective of the citizens’ rights.13 
Many of the transitioning states across the region, including Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and 
Uruguay, created new constitutions that would help move the process forward.  
 
III.     The Colombian Constitution and the Constitutional Court 
 
12 Nagle, “The Cinderella of Government,” 349. 
13 García, “Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America,” 1268; Wilson, “Institutional Reform and Rights 
Revolutions,” 71-75.  
 
 In the early 1990s, Colombia began its own complex process of reform. The government 
first established a constituent-assembly to draft a new constitution with stronger and more 
transparent democratic institutions. The assembly included representatives from various political 
parties, former guerrillas, various religious and indigenous groups, and legislatures.14 The 
members of the assembly debated whether the country needed a constitutional court, an 
important question. Proponents of the court argued that despite the many fleeting constitutions, 
most of them failed to protect the rights of citizens who lack the protection of a trusted court 
system. Some assembly members, however, feared that having a powerful constitutional court 
would lead to a “government of judges,” in which judges would increasingly take on the role of 
the legislature. The proponents responded that the court was essential to address social and 
ethical questions regarding the protection of rights, and not political ones. Both sides eventually 
agreed the new court must remain autonomous and non-politicized.  
 In 1991, the assembly created the Constitutional Court of Colombia, the highest and final 
appellate court in the country’s court hierarchy. Its primary function was to decide the 
constitutionality of laws, acts, and statutes. It was also given an innovative provision, called the 
tutela. The Court, located in Bogotá, held its first session in March of 1992. Nine magistrates, 
each of whom can serve only a single term for eight years, are chosen by the Colombian Senate.  
 Colombia’s extensive judicial reforms have received praise from legal experts. The 
creation of the Constitutional Court, in particular, has strengthened socially and politically 
marginalized citizens’ ability to claim their constitutionally protected rights. The Court has since 
enhanced judicial independence, instituted rules that require no attorney fees or general 
 
14 Rampf and Chavarro, “The 1991 Colombian National Constituent Assembly,” 2. 
 
payments, simplified filing procedures, and employed additional magistrates and court personnel 
to move through caseloads quickly. The Court, housed in modern, technologically advanced 
facilities, offers regular programs for citizens to inform them of both the complaint-filing process 
and of their rights requiring protection, at all times.15  
Though Colombia stands as an effective model for other regional efforts of judicial 
reform, the country’s new approach has confronted serious challenges. For example, some 
complain that with the introduction of the Constitutional Court, judges from the other ranking 
courts have become complacent, more supportive of the status quo, and resistant to change.16 
This “push-back” has created an internal power struggle within the judicial branch. Others have 
complained that the Colombian Constitutional Court has accrued too much power, and the entire 
political system now suffers from “judicialization.” Judicialization is a social-science term 
referring to the overreach of the judicial branch. Rodrigo Yepes defined the term in the following 
manner: “matters traditionally decided through political channels are now increasingly being 
decided by judges.”17 He concluded the Colombian judiciary has managed to isolate itself from 
the other branches of government and now functions with nearly full autonomy. Given the level 
of corruption and mismanagement in the executive and legislative branches, Yepes 
conceptualized Colombia as an example of judicialization, at least in comparison with other 
developing countries.18   
In Colombia, judges are generally viewed as being slightly more transparent and less 
vulnerable to corruption than the officials in other branches. This has resulted, however, in 
 
15 Samuel Issacharoff, “Constitutional Courts and Consolidated Power,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 
62, no. 3 (Summer 2014): 585–612.  
16 García, “Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America,” 1269.  
17 Rodrigo Yepes, “Judicialization of Politics in Colombia: cases, merits, and risks,” International Journal on 
Human Rights 6, (2007): 48-63, https://sur.conectas.org/en/judicialization-politics-colombia/.  
18 Ibid, 49-52.  
profound tension between judges and other government officials. Judges now often find 
themselves pitted against the members of the other political branches and are consequently 
perceived as more democratic. This development has led to a paradoxical shift in democratic 
legitimacy from the political system to the judicial system, as the elected representatives are the 
least trusted. As citizens view the judiciary as more accessible and transparent, increasing 
demands are formulated in legal and judicial terms. Some of the most prominent forms of 
judicialization have included efforts to counter political corruption, to manage economic policy, 
and to protect minority groups, individual autonomy, and stigmatized populations. Unlike other 
scholars, Yepes sees the increasing participation of social actors and citizens as a consequence of 
judicialization, not as a necessary condition to propel it.19  
 
IV. The Constitutional Court and Tutelas 
 
 The designers of the Colombian Constitution expanded the scope for written protections 
of fundamental, individual rights. Before 1991, the judiciary consisted of three primary judicial 
organs – the Supreme Court, the Council of State, and the Superior Judicial Council. The 
tripartite structure often clashed, causing internal confusion and subjecting the Colombian people 
to unaddressed and often ignored human-rights violations. For example, the three highest courts 
consistently refused to protect the rights of its LGBTQ citizens,20 primarily because the 
Colombian state had not yet recognized this group as one in need of protection. The 
Constitutional Court was specifically tasked to address the grievances of marginalized and often 
 
19 Yepes, “Judicialization of Politics in Colombia,” 48-63.   
20 “Colombia: Events of 2020,” Human Rights Watch, October 21, 2020,  https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2021/country-chapters/colombia#. 
unrecognized minority-groups. Since this court is less formal than the others, it provides low-
cost access to the court system for average citizens. Constitutional protections in this court are 
usually afforded through individual tutelas, a revolutionary addition to the Colombian justice 
system.21  
 A tutela is an immediate court action that can be requested if an individual feels his or 
her constitutional rights are being violated, especially if no legal alternative exists for the 
individual to pursue.22 Tutela cases grant easy access to justice and require no legal fees or 
lawyers. Within a few years, the ease of access to a Constitutional Court decision had resulted in 
soaring demand for tutela protections. While the Court chooses which of the tutela cases it 
wishes to examine, the judges only have ten days to render a decision once it is selected. These 
cases typically take precedent over all of the judges' other casework, creating a severe delay in 
other case decisions and a significant backload regarding other constitutional matters.23  The new 
category of fast-track cases has resulted in a seriously overloaded and increasingly ineffectual 
court system.  
 
V.  Plan Colombia     
 
 In the 1980s and 1990s, FARC continued to undermine Colombia’s rule of law and to 
pose a much broader geopolitical threat. In 2000, the U.S. consequently launched the partnership 
known as “Plan Colombia.” The plan was a multilateral developmental effort, framed by the 
 
21 Joris Tielens, “Democracy Isn’t Built in a Day,” Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, May 2, 2020, 
https://nimd.org/democracy-isnt-built-in-a-day-the-case-of-colombia/.  
22 Ibid.  
 
 
government as an ambitious proposal that would address the multitude of problems that had 
undermined Colombia’s political and economic development for decades. The plan sought to 
promote the nation’s economic growth, train law enforcement, combat the spread of narcotics, 
and strengthen judicial institutions.24 Plan Colombia significantly reduced violence within the 
nation for a time. Homicides declined by 50%, while kidnappings declined by 90%. Colombia 
also became a model for police officer training, as it established the protocol for 21 other Latin 
American and African countries.25 Notably, the U.S. agreed to commit $1.3 billion of the $7.5 
billion dedicated to the plan. Yet, its contribution was mostly via military assistance. A group of 
European states also contributed $1 billion to the institutional components of the plan. Though 
Colombia technically committed to providing the remaining sum, its actual budget fell far short. 
Further, little attention was allocated to improving the country’s judicial institutions. Any 
positive benefits have simply followed from the plan’s other priorities, such as combatting the 
spread of narcotics.26 While this was great news, marginalized communities continued to suffer 
from a lack of legal and social protections.  
 
VI. The 2012 Judicial Reform Bill 
    
 In 2012, the Colombian Congress passed a contentious judicial-reform bill. While the bill 
introduced some potentially beneficial changes, it primarily protected criminal public officials. 
On the one hand, the bill granted the Constitutional Court decision-making authority regarding 
 
24 Luz Estella Nagle, “The Search for Accountability and Transparency in Plan Colombia: Reforming Judicial 
Institutions – Again,” Strategic Studies (2001): 1-7, http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep11850.  
25 “Plan Colombia: A Development Success Story,” U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, accessed March 19, 2021, 
http://www.usglc.org/media/2017/04/USGLC-Plan-Columbia.pdf.  
26 Tielens, “Democracy Isn’t Built in a Day.” 
constitutional protections. This measure sought to prevent clashes among the highest courts over 
case outcomes. On the other hand, Congress slipped in an additional provision to reduce overall 
judicial power, as it granted the legislative and executive branches immunity from a guilty court-
conviction. Standing law allowed the Supreme Court to investigate and prosecute congressmen 
and congresswomen who had been indicted for illegal activity, such as collaborating with 
unlawful paramilitary groups. Under the proposed bill, the 1,300 open investigations of high-
ranking government officials facing conviction were to be halted. Rather than propelling 
government transparency, the proposed bill simply created more controversy. Wisely, President 
Juan Manuel Santos rejected the bill and sent it back to Congress for review.27  
 




Although President Santos rejected the 2012 bill, members of Congress continued to 
contribute to insurgent groups. The door to further corruption within the Colombian government 
was consequently left wide open. For the next four years, no official efforts were made for 
judicial reform, and the domestic insurgency continued. However, in 2016, the government 
signed a historic peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forced of Colombia (FARC) to 
end the 52-year armed conflict.28 The peace agreement has served numerous positive benefits for 
the country. First, it has minimized congressional support and collaboration with insurgent 
groups.29 Second, it has opened up civic life, as violence has dropped significantly since 2016. 
Third, it has allowed more opportunities for citizens to pay attention to corruption scandals. The 
 
27 Tielens, “Democracy Isn’t Built in a Day.” 
28 "The Current Situation in Colombia: A USIP Fact Sheet," United States Institute of Peace, December 3, 2020, 
https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/12/current-situation-colombia.  
29 Tielens, “Democracy Isn’t Built in a Day.” 
increasing attention to political affairs has since initiated massive public protests in response to 
government injustices. It is also safer to protest now because paramilitary groups do not openly 
target grass-roots social movements as they did before the agreement.30   
 
 
VIII.  The National Development Plan   
  
 In 2019, three years after the signing of the peace accord with FARC, Colombia’s current 
President, Ivan Duque, launched his National Development Plan (PND). The $325 billion socio-
economic spending plan set the administration’s lofty goals of enhanced education, higher 
employment, more human and economic security, and environmental sustainability. The 
government argued this new plan would pave the way for lasting national peace through a simple 
formula: rule of law + entrepreneurship = equality.31 While the plan addresses several critical 
areas in need of improvement, it neglects to commit any resources to judicial reform. It certainly 
emphasizes a more transparent and efficient state, but it only targets a few individual protection 
agendas. For example, President Duque failed to carry out highly-anticipated reforms to the 
electoral and judiciary systems. This failure helps explain Colombia’s massive public protests 
occurring since November of 2019. 32 This dissatisfaction with the executive branch has also 
contributed to judicialization.  
While the National Development Plan offers a great start for Colombia, the judicial 
branch remains in need of serious reform to ensure PND’s overall goal of a more efficient and 
 
30 “The Current Situation in Colombia.” 
31 Stephen Gill, “Duque Launches His 4-year Development Plan for Colombia,” Colombia Reports, May 28, 2019, 
https://colombiareports.com/colombias-president-duque-launches-4-year-development-plan/.   
32 Sandra Botero and Silvia O. Bahamón, “Colombia is Having its Largest Wave of Protests in Recent Decades. 
Why?,” The Washington Post, December 5, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/05/colombia-
is-having-its-largest-wave-protests-recent-decades-why/.  
just state will succeed. In fact, the government’s failure to implement its promises for improved 
political institutions may lead to another La Violencía, especially as public dissatisfaction 
continues to surge.33 Hence, I conclude Colombia’s government should implement a plan that 
would focus specifically on the judicial branch and would offer detailed, goal-oriented reforms to 
bring about this desired measurable and positive change.    
 
IX.  Current Judicial Problems and Structure 
 
A. Inefficient Justice Administration and Low Public Confidence  
Among the numerous problems facing the judiciary, the process of securing justice in 
Colombia is painfully slow. Judicial understaffing has led to heavy and backlogged caseloads. 
The number of judges per 100,000 people in Colombia is 0.5, which falls well below other Latin 
American countries, including Brazil (1.0), Peru (1.0), and Panama (2.6).34 In fact, the World 
Bank estimates it takes almost four years, on average, to enforce a simple contract. The actual 
amount of time it takes for a case to be resolved exceeds given time restrictions by 200 percent.35 
Moreover, the process in Colombia is very expensive. The cost of litigation as a percentage of 
the claim, at 41%, is substantially higher than the Latin American average.36 Although the 
Constitutional Court and the introduction of the tutela were designed to increase access to 
justice, unforeseen implications remain a problem to be addressed.  
 
33 Adriaan Alsema, “Only Peace Process Can Stop Colombia’s Return to War,” Colombia Reports, February 22, 
2021, https://colombiareports.com/only-peace-process-can-stop-colombias-return-to-war/.  
34 Maria, Dakolias, “Court Performance Around the World: A Comparative Perspective,” Yale Human Rights and 
Development Law Journal 2, no. 1 (1999): 105. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Gustavo Silva Cano, “Fixing Colombia’s Chaotic Judicial System,” Colombia Reports, February 27, 2012, 
https://colombiareports.com/fixing-colombias-chaotic-judicial-system/. 
Public confidence in Colombia’s judicial system also ranks very low among the states of 
Latin America. In a recent opinion survey, only 23% of respondents said they trusted the judicial 
branch, while 39% said they simply had no confidence in it all.37 Another poll showed that 89% 
of all Colombians surveyed believed that judges were corrupt and did not apply the law 
evenhandedly.38 Despite these disconcerting numbers, the judicial system in Colombia is still 
generally viewed more positively than the other two branches of government. Nevertheless, the 
judicial system is overloaded, underfunded, and understaffed, while judges and other judicial 
personnel are undertrained and inefficient.  
 
B.  The Courts 
Considering the past reforms, what exactly does the Colombian judiciary look like today? 
The judicial branch currently consists of four distinct jurisdictions: the ordinary, administrative, 
constitutional, and special jurisdictions. The highest judicial organs are now the Supreme Court, 
the Council of State, the Superior Council of the Judicature, and the Constitutional Court. The 
Supreme Court, divided into two chambers, is technically the highest court regarding ordinary 
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's chambers, each with separate jurisdictions, decide which cases 
are to be heard by its full court. The court can also technically draft its own rules of procedure 
and can exercise the power of judicial review. Judicial review is the authority to decide if the 
legislative and executive branches' actions are valid.39 The Council of State, divided into separate 
chambers, is also tasked with the authority of judicial review, to act as a supreme consultative 
 
37 “Colombia Country Report 2020,” BTI Transformation Index, Bertelsmann Stiftung, accessed March 20, 2021, 
https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report-COL-2020.html.  
38 Dakolias, “Court Performance Around the World,” 115.  
39 “Colombia’s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2015,” Constitute Project, 1991,  
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015.pdf?lang=en.  
body of the government in matters of war or national security, to present proposals to amend the 
Constitution and other bills, and to make its own by-laws. It is more an administrative entity than 
a fully functioning court.  
The Superior Council of the Judicature is divided into two chambers. The first is an 
administrative chamber consisting of six elected judges. Two members are elected by the 
Supreme Court, one by the Constitutional Court, and three by the Council of State. The second is 
a jurisdictional disciplinary chamber made up of seven members elected by the National 
Congress. This Council is in charge of disciplinary and administrative matters such as human 
resources, operations, and finance. It also has the power to draw up lists of judicial candidates for 
appointment to any of these specific judicial entities. Indeed, this is a powerful entity. Moreover, 
the Superior Council has the power to examine and sanction errors of judicial officials and 
lawyers, to settle jurisdictional conflicts between the differing judicial organs, and to oversee the 
productivity of the judicial bodies.40  
Finally, the Constitutional Court is entrusted to safeguard the integrity and supremacy of 
the Constitution. The members of this court are elected by the Senate of the Republic and are 
ineligible for reelection. Its most important function is its ability to take up petitions of 
unconstitutionality brought by citizens and to decide the constitutionality of calls of the Council 
of State to amend the Constitution, national laws, and bills opposed by the government. It can 
also approve international treaties, review judicial decisions connected with the protection of 
constitutional rights, and draft its own by-laws.41  
This complex structure with clearly overlapping responsibilities and jurisdictions 
produces contentious turf wars and bitter disagreements. In fact, these internal disputes take up 
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judicial attention than the human-rights issues that this structure is supposed to address. The four 
organs often ignore the opinions of one another, as they often hold different interpretations of the 
law. The tutela, in particular, is the source of the most common clashes among the courts.42 For 
example, a tutela may bring a claim before the Constitutional Court that a Supreme Court 
decision is unconstitutional and must be struck down. Note that a Supreme Court decision 
follows two rounds of litigation already conducted in the trial and appellate courts. If the losing 
party disagrees with the Supreme Court decision, it now has another chance to claim a favorable 
judgment. Hence, the Constitutional Court has become the fallback or default court, if every 
other appeal fails. Importantly, both the Supreme and Constitutional Court claim binding 
decision-making authority. It is clear that the disagreement between the courts regarding proper 
interpretations of the law and constitutional jurisdiction stems from the overlapping 
responsibilities granted by the Constitution.43 A careful reading reveals serious contradictions 
that must be addressed. There is also a glaring gap between the written Constitution and its 
application. Judges who are supposed to be independent regularly face significant pressure to 
adhere to the desires of the other branches, despite the Constitution granting the Courts 
autonomy and judicial review.  
 
C. The Bifurcated System  
Following the French civil law model, Colombia has a bifurcated judicial system. The 
Supreme Court presides over all private law, which consists of civil and criminal matters. Within 
private law, the civil and criminal spheres of judicial proceedings are entirely separate from one 
another. The primary differences between civil and criminal cases concern the role of the judge.  
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In a civil law system, as opposed to the American common-law system, it is very difficult for a 
citizen to bring a civil case before the courts. The Colombian civil-law system, therefore, 
provides very few resources of legal services. The process, expensive and inaccessible, also 
offers little direct contact between the judges and the parties during the process. Court hearings 
remain private, and decisions are made with a limited direct role of the parties involved. In the 
case of a criminal proceeding, judges conduct the entire investigation on their own by employing 
their own judicial police and making a decision before the defendant ever appears in court. In 
this sense, the Colombian system is inquisitorial, since the judge serves as the investigator, 
prosecutor, and adjudicator simultaneously. The defendant has little ability to confront evidence 
presented against him or her, and there is no impartial third-party to provide lawful due 
process.44  
The Council of State, however, presides over public or administrative law, which 
regulates the operation and procedures of government agencies. The Council plays an important 
role in the appointment and replacement of judicial actors within the other high-ranking judicial 
organs. While most of the abuse of power and official corruption stems from government 
agencies, past reforms have not addressed the Council’s authority, transparency, or degree of 
oversight. The Council may hold too much authority, making the impact of its decisions 
susceptible to ulterior motives. For example, in 2011, the Council made a landmark decision by 
interpreting a new meaning of the Constitution. The Constitution previously held that a nominee 
for the position of Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court needed votes from two-thirds of the 




aggressively prosecuted the corrupted allies of the former right-wing president, Álvaro Uríbe. 
However, the Council of State’s decision has since removed her from office, as it concluded that 
her selection process was unconstitutional. The decision’s implications have thwarted the 
president’s agenda to weaken the influence of former, corrupted political figures.45 Why would 
the Council decide this? It is possible it was simply fulfilling its duty. However, it is important to 
remember the members of the Council are elected by the National Congress. It is quite possible 
that this decision, and perhaps others, were made with a strategic goal to maintain corrupted 
political influence. It would follow from this conclusion that greater accountability measures are 
in order. 
 
X.   Analysis 
 
Colombia's ongoing struggle to establish transparent democratic governance has caught 
the attention of many scholars who have provided a variety of theories seeking to explain the 
country's crisis. As a democratic republic, power and authority should be derived from the 
people.46  Elected officials should serve the people who elect them, work to protect rights, and 
value the enforcement of laws. This is clearly not the case in Colombia. Most of the reforms that 
have taken place in Colombia since the early 1990s have empowered the judiciary. Bruce M. 
Wilson asserts that the failure of Colombia’s democracy has prompted this empowerment –  the 
judicialization of Colombia – and has resulted in a change in the behavior of the country’s 
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highest court. This “rights revolution,” as Wilson labels it, has resulted in the court’s shying 
away from contract-related cases and other disputes in favor of routinely prioritizing the 
protection of individual rights. This has meant that traditionally marginalized people have been 
able to present their claims for constitutionally guaranteed rights and be heard.47 This has also 
meant, however, that other important disputes have been pushed aside. Thus, the court is 
fulfilling only part of its total responsibility. Wilson has argued any potential reform project 
would require the formation of watch-dog organizations to provide support structures and 
external oversight of the judicial branch.48 In America, such support structures take the form of 
reputable organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Felipe García similarly 
asserts that the judiciary requires the introduction of new exogenous bodies to monitor judicial 
functions. Third-party oversight and enforcement are crucial to the institutional structure of 
successful democratic societies.49 Both Wilson and García are referring to the need for an active, 
engaged civil society that monitors the behavior of judges and other officials, publicizes and 
openly criticizes inappropriate behavior, and serves as the eyes and ears of a society focused on 
developing transparent, effective political and judicial institutions.  
Joris Tielens has argued that Colombia’s judicial reforms have actually been quite 
limited. He contends that, despite Colombia’s effort to democratize, the country’s political 
system remains far from democratic. Democracy, he asserts, must be accountable, tolerant, 
diverse, and inclusive. It must protect the rights of all citizens. Its politicians and political 
institutions must respond to the needs of the population and must be held accountable if they do 
not. Colombia, in Tielens’s view, has far to go before it can claim to be a legitimate democratic 
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government with a strong and independent judiciary. The country’s current state of affairs is so 
unstable that such an outcome could never occur “overnight.”50  
Nagle offers a different, and even more negative, interpretation. She believes the lack of 
political stability has been used to justify superficial judicial reforms. To her, Colombia’s 
judicial reforms have served as a distraction from the other more serious problems confronting 
the country, including poverty and persistent violence. In an effort to court U.S. foreign 
assistance, Colombia has pushed forward with an array of judicial reforms to win U.S. support, 
but these have failed to directly address the country’s most pressing problems. Consequently, the 
reforms within the judiciary have only been an extension of the corruption that plagues the entire 
political system. Nagle contends that the judicial branch supports reforms because it brings 
additional funding and more independence. As a result, the branch fails to address fundamental 
problems. In sum, she believes judicialization is nothing more than the elite political class 
continuing to manipulate representative democracy to serve its own interests and to starve 
citizens of genuine and substantive change.51  
 
XI.  Obstacles Confronting Colombia’s Attempts to Reform 
 
 Scholars broadly agree on the central obstacles confronting Colombia’s efforts at judicial 
and political reforms. Nagle has argued that the judiciary is no more inclined to reform itself than 
any other institution in Colombia. The judiciary has long benefited from the status quo and is 
 
50 Tielens, “Democracy Isn’t Built in a Day.”  
51 Luz E. Nagle, “Colombia’s Faceless Justice: A Necessary Evil, Blind Impartiality, or Modern Inquisition?,” 
Stetson University, (July 2013):  945-946, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228222162_Colombia's_Faceless_Justice_A_Necessary_Evil_Blind_Impa
rtiality_or_Modern_Inquisition.  
therefore unwilling to consider reform.52  Indeed, Nagle points to culture as the most serious 
obstacle. The higher courts have historically commanded little respect from the other branches or 
the citizens. Colombian courts, like the courts in so many other Latin American countries, have 
traditionally "rubber-stamped" the executive's actions by finding constitutional justification for 
them. This has demonstrated a clear lack of judicial will to interfere in law-making procedures 
and has provided executives freewill to dominate Colombia’s politics as they please. Although 
the governmental reforms initiated in the early 1990s assigned the judicial branch the 
responsibility to bring about democratization, transparency, and the protection of human rights, 
the judiciary has refused to step up and carry out this task.53  Instead, it has minimized its own 
power by allowing political elites to bribe judges to ensure favorable outcomes of distributive 
decisions or to enhance political advantages. Therefore, the judiciary has put its own self-
preservation above its democratization obligations.54  
Indeed, the judiciary has adopted a defensive and reactive response to change and an 
unwillingness to carry out the kinds of responsibilities envisioned for it in the Constitution.  
García has argued that judges have grown comfortable with their arrangement with the political 
elite and subsequently view demands for change as threats to their security, rather than as 
opportunities for political and social development. Moreover, judges have creative recalcitrant 
patterns of resistance and have rejected the modern blueprint put before them. Rather, they have 
clung to performing their traditional tasks. This behavior clearly reflects the organizational 
patterns inherited from the colonial period and long-enduring institutional instability. The 
judiciary clearly desires to protect its traditional role and its security.  Consequently, its 
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popularity and legitimacy among Colombian citizens have suffered.55 This resistance suggests 
the need for added pressure from outside of the judicial organization is at this point, hard to 
envision. 
Judicial unresponsiveness clearly must be accounted for when creating a plan for 
substantive change. According to García, the informal constraints embodied in traditions and 
culture are almost always more resistant to change than formal policies or rules. This explains 
why the introduction of the Constitutional Court serves only as a partial solution to the deeper-
rooted inefficiencies of the courts. While it offered a convenient path to access justice for 
Colombian citizens, it failed to address the defensive or reactive nature of the judiciary as a 
whole. By introducing a court high enough to challenge the long-standing authority of the 
Supreme Court, it makes sense why the two judicial bodies cannot see eye-to-eye regarding 
Constitutional interpretation. On one hand, the new Constitutional Court judges seek to liberate 
the people and provide a remedy for their grievances. Both its focus and its authority vis-à-vis 
the rest of the judiciary create internal tensions that have destructive potential.  
Plan Colombia offered another attempt at judicial reform, but it too fell far short for 
several reasons. First, the plan failed to consider its impact on the region and the geopolitical 
threats imposed on Colombia’s neighbors. The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID)-sponsored judicial reform was viewed by neighboring states as a tool to 
advance a U.S. foreign-policy agenda, in addition to a rule-of-law program. While this view may 
have been overly simplified and discounted the positive aspects of the program, the U.S. indeed 
funded a strengthening of the country's courts with an intent to more effectively prosecute drug 
lords.56 Note that Colombia’s laws do not allow it to extradite Colombian nationals. Many 
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Colombian traffickers who had been arrested in Colombia and indicted in U.S. courts, had to be 
tried in Colombian courts, which had a less than impressive conviction rate. So, while improving 
the administration of justice in Latin America has long been a critically important goal of 
USAID, Plan Colombia has a drug-trafficking component that tainted, in part, the American 
effort.  
Along with the judicial reforms, Plan Colombia offered military support and institutional 
strengthening as part of a regional effort to bring down the cartels. In return for U.S. assistance, 
Colombia, along with Argentina, Honduras, and other Latin American countries, diplomatically 
supported the 1999 U.S.-led United Nations invasion of Kuwait to repel Iraq’s aggression.  
Colombia’s neighbors, especially Ecuador, which the Colombian government had accused of 
harboring FARC insurgents, viewed Plan Colombia as a threat because of its effort to strengthen 
the Colombian military.57 Finally, while the Colombian government managed to bring down the 
Colombian cartels and the level of drug-related violence, the root problem of a weak, ineffectual, 
and corrupt government with little interest in ensuring the fair and equitable administration of 
justice has remained a central problem. To make matters worse, Plan Colombia failed to clearly 
identify its broader objectives regarding judicial reforms. Consequently, the funding supported 
spending increases within the judicial branch but resulted in limited real or measurable 
improvements in the administration of justice. It is evident any future reform must learn from 
Plan Colombia’s mistakes.  
The numerous obstacles confronting Colombia raise a central question: what now? How 
does a system reform itself if those in charge are comfortable with the power that they wield vis-
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à-vis the citizens? The country has endured external pressure from international and regional 
organizations, foreign governments, and legal experts. Yet, its reforms have been superficial, 
confusing, and have in many instances, created more problems than they have solved. Clearly, 
Colombia needs a far-reaching, comprehensive round of serious judicial reforms. 
 
XII.  So, What Does the Colombian Judicial Branch Need?  
 
In the final section of this paper, drawing from Colombian newspapers, think-tank 
reports, survey research, and academic studies, I will outline a comprehensive reform proposal to 
potentially reform Colombia’s judiciary. There are a few important considerations to address. 
First, future reforms mustn't be subject to a "sub-category" of a larger agenda. History shows that 
overly broad plans with multiple-tiered agendas fail to allocate enough attention to 
judicialization. Note that judicialization places the judiciary at the center of the political process 
and provides it with the authority and oversight necessary to act in the interest of the country as a 
whole.58 Second, the proposed agenda should also deal with most of the institutional and 
organizational elements that determine a coherent judicial performance synchronously. The 
change will likely require a combination of modifications mainly from within the judiciary's 
institutional and organizational structure. Most importantly, the strategy will be feasible only if 
Colombia's government develops a broad consensus about the specific reform agenda. Potential 
opposition from the incumbent leadership should be expected and planned for accordingly. 
Third, compromise will be essential in the government’s effort to create a working consensus. 
The constituents, who will ultimately judge the legitimacy and transparency of the judicial 
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branch, must also agree with this consensus. Scholars have suggested that a phased reform 
process may be the key to smoothly transitioning Colombia and to developing such a 
consensus.59  
In sum, the judicial-reform plan should address three major criteria: financial 
sustainability, judicial competence, and judicial accountability.60 Also, its overarching goals 
should be two-fold, addressing responsiveness and trust. The first overarching objective is to 
establish greater judicial effectiveness regarding its principal functions including the guarantee 
of administration of justice and dispute resolution.61 The second objective is to establish 
sufficient judicial trustworthiness and responsiveness to the demands of society. This will 
include opening itself to scrutiny and citizen participation, so it can adhere to society’s values, 
rather than its own.  
Judicial reform projects are generally oriented in procedural and administrative terms.62   
I will follow this pattern. Procedural reforms target issues of judicial efficiency and 
effectiveness.63 Thus, procedural reforms focus on the first objective of judicial effectiveness, 
including the necessary improvements of judicial competence and accountability, as well as the 
financial sustainability necessary for the plan. Administrative reforms target improvements to 
public life, such as eliminating corruption, increasing representativeness, and fostering the 
participation of citizens and citizen groups.64 Therefore, administrative reforms target our second 
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objective to enhance judicial trustworthiness and responsiveness. It is essential to address 
objective number one first, as legitimacy and trust can only follow from a sufficient judicial 
performance.  
While pursuing the two primary objectives, the proposal should be strategically 
implemented in phases. The first phase of the process should properly allocate the funding 
necessary to carry the plan out. Here, it is important to address the financial burdens placed on 
potential reform, especially the economic conditionality entrapment with the U.S. The second 
phase should address overall judicial competence. Improvement to areas such as case 
management, personnel training and staffing, and education may prove to benefit the judiciary’s 
efficiency and effectiveness. The third phase should focus on changes aimed at increasing the 
degree of responsiveness and accountability of the judicial governance structure to the needs of 
an increasing modem and democratic society. Note the recent protests make it clear that the 
Colombian public seeks improved transparency and functionality from its judiciary. It follows 
that allowing the public to participate in the later stages of the process will be essential. 
However, it is critical to first ensure the people will be safe while participating in judicial 
proceedings, especially considering the history of bribes and threats to judicial actors. Hence, it 
may take years before the final phase, as suggested, can be realistically implemented, because 
improving judicial competence and accountability to an acceptable level will take time.    
 
A. Financial Sustainability 
 
First and foremost, the plan proposed in this paper will likely carry a hefty price tag. It is 
well known the U.S. has a history of creating incentives in Latin America to strengthen the 
region’s rule of law, to support market economies, and to encourage representative democratic 
governments. It follows that the U.S. government has financially supported several of 
Colombia’s previous reforms. Many U.S.-funded programs, however, including Plan Colombia, 
went far beyond judicial reforms and prioritized other agendas. Now, I acknowledge that foreign 
assistance could help provide critically important funding for the following phases of reform. If 
possible though, Colombia should try to avoid wholly depending on other sources of assistance 
and instead allocate a reasonable portion of its own budget to these objectives. This would be a 
wise far-reaching investment for the country, both in support of its own democratic development 
and for greater economic and political stability. If this is not possible, an alternative option might 
be for the country to develop private-public programs that draw on the expertise and resources of 
private-sector organizations, legal experts, and scholars, combined with public-sector civil 
servants and occasionally, foreign experts.   
 
B.  Competence 
 
Once a financial plan is in order, the internal workings of the judiciary could benefit from 
thorough adjustment. It is important to first consider the judiciary in Colombia has never been 
considered to be an equal branch of the government. This has limited the branch’s capacity to 
function independently, as the Constitution intended. We should first determine where current 
judicial actors lack regarding competence to remedy this discrepancy. First, the Colombian 
judiciary has little to no ability to investigate a crime in a professional, forthright, or accountable 
manner. Second, judges have little to no education or training required to accomplish their jobs 
effectively. Third, they are not required to undertake meticulous background checks before being 
hired. Since judges lack professionalism, they tend to be more receptive to bribery and 
intimidation.65   
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To initiate necessary change, I suggest intensive re-training of the current judicial actors. 
It is also essential to train aspiring judicial actors before they can take office. As the current 
members retire, these new and more qualified actors will replace their predecessors. Through 
continuous replacement, the branch could eventually "turn over a new leaf," and thus function 
more effectively as a whole. Hence, Colombia should establish a national academy designed to 
train aspiring judges, judicial police, prosecutors, and investigative units immediately after 
college. The training academy regimen would likely instill discipline and establish a common 
loyalty, at least among its aspiring judicial actors. It would also provide overarching 
cohesiveness and consistency throughout the system, and therefore grant less opportunity for 
personal gain.66 The academy should also increase service requirements to ensure only the most 
qualified individuals are eligible to rise to such positions of power. USAID has long funded such 
programs in Latin America, with varying levels of success. Perhaps, a country with a civil-law, 
rather than a common-law system, could help fund the judicial academies and employ its own 
professionals to train Colombian actors. Since the contributing country would understand civil 
law procedures, its input may be more compatible with Colombia’s judicial system than 
programs from the United States. For example, Switzerland, a civil-law country, has led 17 Latin 
American countries’ judicial academies since 2004. The course is considered very successful, as 
it promotes improved justice administration services and judicial training activities.67   
To advance the judiciary’s competency further, improving its access to justice and 
dispute resolution is critical. Since the 2012 reform-attempt, Colombia has made notable 
progress in improving its access to justice. The 2015 Justice Service Strengthening Project 
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(JSSP) has advanced legal reforms with a primary focus on transitioning the judiciary from a 
written to an oral court system. The new system has streamlined previously time-consuming 
written communications into a single court hearing and consequently reduced the number of 
backlogged cases across the system. JSSP has also expanded access to justice for groups of 
society who previously struggled to utilize dispute-resolution services. It also plans to combine 
its numerous reforms into a “unified management model,” consolidating different court systems 
through a centralized database.68 Though the Justice Service Strengthening Project has reduced 
judicial congestion and introduced alternate dispute mechanisms, reform has only targeted major 
cities. As a result, its positive outcomes have yet to make an impact on more isolated areas. I 
recommend that new reform builds upon the progress made in cities to eventually expand to 
every court across Colombia. Divided by region, centralized information centers and courts 
could be led by judicial actors who have graduated from the training academy.  
Importantly, I recognize it will take many years before all of the current judicial actors 
will retire, allowing the newly trained actors to take their place. There is no also guarantee the 
first-generation removed will be immune to the same faults as their predecessors. Hence, 
potentially effective reform should continue to restructure the judicial system itself to address 
deeper-rooted inefficiencies. Scholars have found the bifurcated structure of Colombia’s highest 
courts harms the judiciary’s effectiveness and efficiency at the most fundamental level.69 The 
Supreme Court currently presides over civil and criminal matters, while the Council of State 
presides over the public or administrative law. Additionally, the tutela remedy within the 
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Constitutional Court specifically allows the Supreme Court's ruling to be rejected. This lack of a 
clear hierarchical order among the three highest courts fails to establish one court with supreme 
authority. Therefore, a critical adjustment is in order.  
Below the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, numerous appellate and district courts 
currently function similarly to the thirteen U.S. Court of Appeals System. A court of appeals 
hears challenges to district court decisions within its circuit, as well as appeals from the decisions 
of federal administrative agencies.70 I suggest that more appellate and district courts be 
implemented to take priority hearing all local and regional cases. This would leave only federal-
level cases to the highest courts. While non-federal cases may occasionally reach the Supreme 
Court, this should occur significantly less often than it does in the current structure.  
Although, another provision is needed to address the hierarchical confusion between the 
Supreme and Constitutional Courts. I suggest Colombia keep the Constitutional Court intact. It 
has already established a trustworthy reputation among Colombian citizens and successfully 
administers individual constitutional protections. The tutela provision itself, however, should be 
refined. The Constitutional Court should not serve as a “higher” authority to the Supreme Court 
with the ability to overrule its prior decisions via the tutela. Rather, only constitutional-
jurisdiction decisions made in lower appellate courts should be subject to additional appeal to be 
heard by the Constitutional Court. The two courts should then never hear each other’s cases, as 
they would only hear cases within their distinct jurisdictions. The provision should also allow the 
courts to be less subject to over-rulings from the other. They would also benefit from smaller 
caseloads, as the new lower courts in each jurisdiction would make the less-impactful decisions 
on a day-to-day basis.  
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C.  Accountability  
 
Reform must also take into serious consideration the current lack of accountability among 
the courts. First, courts should not be allowed to continue to oversee themselves and to create 
their own rules of procedure. The current system of granting each court such autonomy means 
that judges can bend their interpretation of the law as they see fit. Instead, general rules of 
procedure should be created and ideally enforced independently of the judges themselves.71 
However, scholars struggle to identify a political body that could best enforce such procedures. 
As of right now, this question remains. What is known, however, is that to entrust any of the 
courts to make lawful and just decisions, the plan must, in García's words, minimize the "enclave 
and autocratic nature of the current judicial leadership." 72   
Some scholars have suggested that serious consideration should be given to the selection 
of court justices to accomplish this. Doing so could allow judges to acquire greater levels of 
political legitimacy and the people’s trust. This recommendation presents the perfect opportunity 
to provide civil society the participation it desires. Judges in Colombia, however, have strongly 
resisted any diminishing of their autonomy and have not welcomed civil-society input.73  
Scholars generally recognize the defensive tendencies of Colombian judges when it comes to 
introducing change, as well as their autocratic desire to retain power and autonomy. We can 
thereby conclude that any changes to the judiciary's structure and its operational policies must 
carefully balance the judiciary’s autonomy with its accountability vis-à-vis civil society.74  
 
71 Nagle “The Search for Accountability and Transparency in Plan Colombia,” 23-24.  
72 García, “Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America,” 1322-1324. 
73 See, for example, García, “Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America,” 1322-1324; Nagle, “Colombia’s Faceless 
Justice,” 945-946. 
74 García, “Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America,” 1316. 
 Recall the Superior Council can create lists of judicial candidates for a specific judicial 
entity, including the other highest courts. Hence, it makes sense that judges and congressional 
members often nominate their political allies to the Superior Council. This then allows further 
abuse of power to endure. So, there must be changes to the discretionary nature of the 
appointment process to mitigate the inbreeding within the judicial bureaucracy.75 I assert the 
Superior Council’s responsibility to uphold the proposed rules of procedures can only be fulfilled 
if its nomination process is left to a wholly independent actor. Ideally, the president, who is often 
elected by the people and is potentially less corrupt, would select the members of this body. 
However, Colombian presidents are not immune to potential misconduct and should not be 
trusted to carry out this role. A better option might be to entrust the nomination process to the 
people.76 Of course, that presents additional problems. 
If the selection of the Superior Council’s members were to be entrusted to civil society, 
this would remedy the fact that civil-society participation in Colombia’s justice administration 
falls well below that of most other developing countries. Civil society has historically played no 
role in contributing to the administration of justice in Colombia, as its civil-law system does not 
have juries or elected judges. To include the people in this selection process, the Superior 
Council’s nominees should be considered exclusively based on merit with prevalent civil 
organizations’ (CSOs) input.77 The CSOs would be in charge of finding and providing evidence 
for or against potential judges and would then put forward potential members. The nominees 
would have to be vetted in some fashion, before eventually being placed before the public for a 
vote. Then, the people could choose accordingly. Once an election has taken place, the nominees 
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with a majority of the votes will proceed to take office. This new selection process would also 
help society learn to trust the judiciary, as judges will be inclined to act more ethically to meet 
societal expectations.  
The next step to increase judicial accountability is to modify the current watchdog 
judicial organ. This modified watchdog organ would oversee the new general rules of judicial 
procedure. I suggest the newly modified Superior Council of the Judicature. This body, wholly 
within the judiciary, already supervises the courts and could take on an expanded role. Recall the 
Council already examines and sanctions errors of judicial officials and lawyers, settles 
jurisdictional conflicts among the differing judicial organs, and oversees the productivity of the 
judicial bodies. Hence, the Council’s modification would allow it to carry out its functions in a 
more forthright manner. However, some scholars have suggested civil organizations should 
instead monitor judicial decisions and serve as watchdogs. While entrusting exogenous bodies to 
oversee the judiciary sounds ideal, this has proven to fail in other Latin American countries. 
These administrative bodies have often proven to be ineffective and unable to ensure 
administrative efficiency and accountability. They instead tend to pose an additional disruptive 
component to the already-weak justice-oversight function.78 Further, entrusting the oversight 
function to a non-judiciary body is not ideal given the lengthy past of judicial subordination.  
However, there are other ways to implement necessary civil society participation in 
Colombia. The country could benefit from allowing society to gain insight into the general 
proceedings of the courts at every level. To accomplish this, the judiciary must first open itself to 
greater scrutiny from the news media to monitor its proceedings and conduct. Opening judicial 
proceedings to greater scrutiny would force acting judges to adhere to the public’s opinion and 
 
78 Ibid, 1305-1311. 
make it harder to manipulate the system for their personal benefit. Second, a specific code of 
personal and professional conduct for judges should be introduced by the new Superior Council. 
Specific sanctions should then be established and enforced to monitor behavior, to ensure the 
proper enforcement of rules, and to ensure that all judges expedite the court's case-hearing 
process effectively.79 Sanctions could range from a simple warning, potentially harming their re-
election candidacy, to removal from office.  
Of course, these reforms would create a series of new challenges. It is difficult to predict 
how engaged citizens would become, the extent to which they would investigate the record of the 
judicial nominees, the transparency of CSOs, and the overall feasibility of this rather drawn-out 
process. Outside of recent protests, the Colombian citizenry does not have a record of extensive 
active civil-society engagement. This kind of behavioral change would require a fundamental 
change in values and attitudes toward both the judiciary and the relationship between citizens 
and the state. These reforms could thus be tested on a local or “pilot” court, to measure 
feasibility before expanding to all courts.  
Moreover, society cannot gain sufficient insight into the courts unless the clash between 
how the judiciary attempts to enforce the law and how the people view the law is remedied. A 
modern democracy’s norms often assume the people understand democratic principles and thus 
submit to live under its single rule of law. However, Colombia currently possesses two rules of 
law: the unofficial vigilante law remaining from FARC and the official law of the land. The 
government has historically neglected its responsibility to educate its citizens about their rights 
and how the democratic-republic system operates. This neglect is partially to blame for the 
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citizen’s lack of trust towards the judicial system, as there is a clear disconnect between the 
judicial decision-making process and how the decisions are justified to society.80  
Though the government has established a few user-information offices in larger cities to 
disseminate justice-sector standards, this service remains very limited. The lack of trust in the 
courts should be addressed across the entire nation, especially considering its role in the 
prominence of judicial vigilantism. Vigilantes are paramilitary groups who take their region’s 
law into their own hands. The people in rural areas especially have come to accept vigilantism, 
because their only other option is to wait for months or years for the courts to provide legal 
services.81 The Colombian state has come to unofficially accept these alternative legal processes 
as semi-legitimate.  However, if the proposed reform were to prioritize judicial outreach and 
public education, the judiciary could potentially regain the people's trust and thereby reduce their 
dependency on vigilante administration of justice. If vigilante law's legitimacy is eliminated, 
then the law of the land could finally rule.   
Then, once the people learn of the system, they will expect it to function as designed. The 
following reforms could eventually be implemented across all courts to garner more of the 
public’s trust. First, lay-citizen juries might be introduced into judicial proceedings. Because of 
the civil-law nature of the Colombian judicial system, this would require some alterations to the 
process.  But in modern common-law democracies, juries hear evidence, listen to both parties' 
arguments, and decide whether the court established beyond reasonable doubt for criminal cases 
or on the balance of probability for civil cases.82 Juries are essential to democracy because they 
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provide an unbiased, impartial perspective derived from the people. Accordingly, decision-
making is decentralized and made by a group, rather than a single official. Other Latin American 
civil-law systems, including that of Mexico, have introduced the partial use of juries, and the 
results have been positive.83 Further, juries reflect the notion of justice held by ordinary citizens 
and thus constitute a key connection between the judiciary and civil society. Second, there is a 
lack of personal contact between judges and the parties during the judicial process. This largely 
contributes to the lack of fair judicial treatment towards the disadvantaged, especially in civil 
matters. Providing adequate direct contact would provide judges with a first-hand understanding 
of the reality of a case, rather than seeing it through the constrained lenses of a written 
presentation. Third, the high level of discretion in the management of the criminal process should 
be resolved. Courts should establish overarching reporting duties, so the judges have to inform 
the public of their investigative progress as the case proceeds.84 This will also serve civil 
society’s desire for additional transparency.  
 
XIII.   Conclusion 
 
Despite its uphill battle to reverse centuries of judicial subordination, Colombia has made 
significant strides towards creating a judicial branch capable of protecting individual rights. 
Fortunately, the Colombian people see hope in such reforms, especially the Constitutional Court. 
Yet, the people have become discontent with their leadership’s failures. They have realized the 
importance of strengthening judicial institutions and have put pressure on elected leaders to 
 
83 Hiroshi Fukurai and Richard Krooth, “The Establishment of All-Citizen Juries as a Key Component of Mexico’s 
Judicial Reform,” Texas Hispanic Journal of Law and Policy 16, no. 51 (2010): 75-77. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316439397.   
84 García, “Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America,” 1303-1305. 
make rapid, substantive progress. Learning from previous reforms’ mistakes, Colombia’s 
leadership has plenty of information to work with. However, it is important for future reforms to 
address the root of the judiciary’s problems, to formulate a specific judicial-focused plan, and to 
carry it out in distinct phases. Colombia must also carefully address the financial sustainability of 
such a plan and invest heavily in improving judicial competence and accountability. While it is 
unreasonable to assume this plan could remedy all of Colombia’s judicial branch’s weaknesses 
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